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Abstract 
One of the foremost tasks of feminism is the exposure of, and struggle against, violence toward 
women. In the twenty-first century this violence shows no sign of decreasing. In this essay the 
author argues that because the discourse on violence has tended to be appropriated by radical 
feminist thinking—violence is not only, but also exclusively, what men do to women—the 
question of violence, as part of psychic reality, has become something that feminism repudiates. 
Continuing her ongoing engagement with psychoanalysis and feminism, she explores two women 
thinkers who placed violence at the core of their life’s work—Hannah Arendt and Melanie 
Klein—both of whom track the complex relation between violence in the world and in the mind. 
How might their understanding of violence be theorized for modern feminism? 
When I was working on Sylvia Plath more than twenty years ago, I discovered that, almost 
simultaneously, the distinguished critic and biographer Diane Middlebrook was working on 
Anne Sexton. Upon completion of our books—we shared at least one train ride on our way to 
readings across England—we were both in a state of not only exhilaration but also shock. Both 
poets had required us—a requirement each of us experienced as an exclusive, personal, 
invitation—to immerse ourselves in what it meant to suffer as a woman in the 1950s and early 
1960s. But they did so with such vigor and riotousness as to deprive us of, or at least exceed, the 
most obvious narrative of subordination that you might expect such suffering to evoke. Sexton 
and Plath were angry—they had a lot to be angry about. But in both cases, the anger did not 
block, as it so easily can, the complex internal reckoning that as women they conducted with 
themselves.
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 If this central reality united our projects and fueled our respect and love for the two poets, 
it also overrode what was the most striking discrepancy between our experiences in writing our 
books. At every turn, I (like so many Plath scholars) had been obstructed by the Plath estate, 
Olwyn and then Ted Hughes, who hated my book, and insisted it was a biography, which it 
wasn’t.2 They felt I had transgressed the boundary between literary criticism and life story, a life 
story whose true version they knew themselves, without reserve, to be in sole possession of. 
Diane’s problem was the opposite. If anything the Sexton estate had been too cooperative, 
flooding her with what today we call “too much information,” whether in the form of the release 
by Sexton’s analyst of the tapes she made after her sessions at his instruction to prevent her 
obliterating them from her mind or in the revelations by Sexton’s daughter, pressed on Diane, of 
being intimately invaded by her mother. 
If that moment has stayed with me, it is because of the ethical dilemma we both faced. 
Neither Sexton nor Plath lived to see the birth of second-wave feminism. It is tempting, and not 
wholly inappropriate, to think that if they had enjoyed the advantage of feminist insight and 
solidarity they might both have been alive today. Certainly, their anguish as women was rooted 
in the perils of domesticity and child-rearing, which would become the target of that wave of 
feminism’s opening and loudest complaint and for which they were among the first to craft the 
poetic language, to give it voice. But that was not all. Sexton was an emotional hurricane. At the 
center of that hurricane there is a tale of domestic abuse—by her father, possibly by her beloved 
aunt, later of her own daughter. As this story migrates across genders and generations, there is no 
neat version to be told. It swallows up too many people, regurgitates through Sexton’s life and 
writing (such regurgitation is of course recognized today as the hallmark of abuse). Plath, for her 
part, felt herself trapped by a desire that drowned her in its intensity and left her stranded on the 
 far shore of a domestic ideal that was a travesty of her own fierce and expansive imaginative 
reach. 
What we shared was our respect for the psychic risks that being a poet allowed both these 
women to take, together with the conviction that the energy with which they did so is more 
important than the fact of their deaths. “What I most want to know about women in the past” is 
not, therefore, as Catherine MacKinnon puts it in an article first published in 1992, “how did she 
die?” but rather, “how did she live?” (2006a, 28). And I also want that question to be able to 
gather on its journey whatever it may find, however messy and unexpected, on its path. Central 
to what follows is the proposition that feminism has nothing to gain by seeing women solely or 
predominantly as the victims of their histories. 
If I quote MacKinnon it is not just because she represents a viewpoint from which I 
dissent nor because I know there are many feminist scholars who draw productively from her 
work. It is also because, as she has most loudly and consistently alerted us, the times we live in 
oblige any feminist to reckon with the increasing, or certainly increasingly visible, violence 
against women that we seem to be witnessing today. In March 2014, Gayatri Spivak gave the 
Juliet Mitchell Lecture in Cambridge on rape as both a—if not the—crime of identity and as the 
“indestructible unconditionality” of the human: “We are,” she stated, “male and female—raped 
into humanity.” “This is,” she stated, “the human condition.”3 This did not, of course, stop her 
from naming rape as the crime against women which it mostly is. Feminism today cannot not 
talk about such crimes, whether rape as a war crime, fgm, or domestic abuse. To pluck just one 
out of a barrage of recent statistics and reports, a survey of forty-two thousand women across 
twenty-eight EU member states released in March 2014 found violence against women to be an 
extensive human rights abuse throughout Europe, with one in three women reporting some form 
 of physical or sexual abuse since the age of fifteen and the UK reporting the joint fifth highest 
incidence of physical and sexual violence.
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 Most of that violence is carried out by a current or 
former partner with nearly one in four women in relationships reporting partner abuse. 
Disturbingly, the incidence of abuse does not seem to decline with a rise in equality. Violence 
against women in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, each praised for their gender equality, 
outstrips the UK rate. Central to the problem is that domestic abuse is one of the least-reported 
crimes.
5
 The statistics are therefore, as always, misleading, in the case of such abuse perhaps 
even more so than usual. In discussion of these reports, we hear little of the obstacles that litter 
the path between sexual violation, indeed between all sexuality, and language (where it is not 
just a matter of finding the courage to speak)—compounded of course by the institutionalized 
refusal of those in positions of authority to listen. 
Domestic abuse is not the worst, but I do not want to list all the forms of global violence 
against women as it is one feminist tactic to do. Feminism is not served by turning violence into 
a litany, as if the only way to make us think about such violence is by verbally driving it home, 
rubbing it in our face, as one might say. When we look at the picture of a woman who died on 
9/11, the first and only feminist question should not, to my mind, be—MacKinnon again—“who 
hurt her before?” (2006a, 28); nor, when we look at the bones of a woman from an ancient 
civilization, do I want us to see her, and them, as, inevitably, broken. Such a strategy does not 
help us to think. It is a central argument of this essay that violence against women is a crime of 
the deepest thoughtlessness. It is a sign that the mind has brutally blocked itself. The best way, I 
argue, for feminism to counter violence against women is to speak of, to stay and reckon with, 
the extraordinary, often painful, and mostly overlooked, range of what the human mind is 
capable of. The title of this essay is “Feminism and the Abomination of Violence.” Violence for 
 me is part of the psyche. A crime to be detested and cast off but also something that one 
feminism, in the very force of that gesture—however necessary, however right at one level—
then itself repudiates, renders unthinkable, shuns beyond the remit of the human (precisely 
abominates). At that moment, feminism finds itself replicating that part of the mind that cannot 
tolerate its own complexity. It thereby becomes complicit with the psychic processes that lead to 
the enactment of violence itself. For me it then becomes crushing—or to put it more crassly, cuts 
off its nose to spite its face. 
I take my idea of thoughtlessness from Hannah Arendt, to whom—along with Melanie 
Klein—I appeal here as offering a new way of thinking about violence against women in our 
time. Following and anticipating Sexton and Plath, both Arendt and Klein suggest that there is 
something about the process of human thought that is often insufferable, not least because 
thinking acts as a break on the fantasy that the world is there to be mastered and thereby prevents 
that dangerous fantasy from doing untold damage by running amuck or away with itself. For 
Arendt, violence is a form of radical self-deceit—or “the impotence of bigness,” to use her 
phrase—that punishes the world, punishes women we can say, for the limitations of human 
power (the gender implications of her phrase “impotence of bigness” are surely glaring even if 
she does not fully draw them out herself) (1972, 34). “What I propose, therefore, is very simple,” 
she writes at the beginning of The Human Condition, “it is nothing more than to think about what 
we are doing” (1958, 5). As often with Arendt, such simplicity is deceptive. Thinking as process 
has to be fought for. It is threatened from all sides, by modern pseudoknowledge which leaves us 
at the mercy of every gadget that is technically possible “however murderous it is,” and by the 
muteness of sheer violence: “Only sheer violence,” she writes, “is mute” (6). For Arendt, 
therefore, the mind is under siege, and thinking is the only restraint against murderous know-how 
 and the cruel silence of sheer violence which mutes both itself and its victims. 
Arendt wrote The Human Condition in the 1950s (it was published in 1958)—the 
moment, of course, of Sexton and Plath—when the power of death-dealing technology had 
reached new heights: from industrial genocide to the atom bomb. “The technical development of 
the implements of violence,” she writes in her later 1970 study On Violence, “has now reached a 
point where no political goal could conceivably correspond to their destructive potential or 
justify their actual use in armed conflict” (1970a, 3). The “suicidal” development of modern 
weapons involves “a massive intrusion of criminal violence into politics” (14). Behind this 
analysis is her indictment of the myth of “progress” which the United States, where she arrived 
as a refugee from Nazism in the 1930s, believed itself to embody beyond any other nation 
(today’s version would be Hillary Clinton describing the United States as the “indispensable 
nation,” which of course sanctions any worldwide intervention the United States wishes to 
make). For Arendt, “progress” is a ruthless illusion, a self-fulfilling prophecy, which leaves itself 
no escape clause other than the increasingly violent enactment of itself. Or to put it another way, 
so-called progress leads directly to the burnt bodies of Vietnam. 
Arendt is not, to put it mildly, most famous for her contribution to feminism, any more 
indeed than Melanie Klein, on which more later, although the case for Arendt’s contribution to 
feminism has been made strongly by scholars such as Seyla Benhabib and Mary Dietz, whose 
readings are the starting points for mine.
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 But there is an important gender dimension to her work 
(and, as I argue, to Klein’s). It is there in that “impotent bigness”—a phrase to which I will 
return. But, almost despite herself, Arendt can be seen as the forerunner of one feminist analysis 
that traces women’s subordination, and the violence that is so often its consequence, first and 
foremost to the division of labor in—or rather consignment of women to—the home. Arendt’s 
 political ideal is the Greek city space of the polis. Indeed, so invested is she in the Athenian 
model of democracy that she has often been accused of overlooking (or worse, reinforcing) the 
status of women and slaves on whose bodies and backs it built itself. But Arendt makes it clear 
that if the home and family life are prepolitical, it is because, she writes, they are the place 
“where the household head ruled with uncontested despotic powers” (1958, 27). It is because the 
paterfamilias rules with such absolute power in the household that it remains outside the domain 
of politics: “Even the power of the tyrant was less great, less ‘perfect’ than the power with which 
the paterfamilias, the dominus, ruled over the household of slaves and family” (27). 
The consequence is violence in the home. Freedom belonged exclusively in the political 
realm, whereas the household was the place of necessity—read the base environment of 
creaturely life (or “housework,” as we call it today)—that must be mastered for man to be free. 
Out of this forced discrimination, violence surely follows. Because, in Greek thought, “all human 
beings are subject to necessity,” Arendt explains, “they are entitled to violence towards others” 
(1958, 31). Violence then becomes the “pre-political act of liberating oneself from the necessity 
of life for the freedom of the world” (31). That is why to be a slave means, not just loss of 
freedom, but being subject to man-made violence. And this is also why there is no real sexual 
division of labor—nothing one could even grace with the epithet of “separate spheres”—since 
such a notion relies on an at least formal assumption of equality between man and women, 
whereas no such assumption existed. Women and slaves—Arendt is surely hardly condoning the 
equation—stand in, and for, the place where the necessity of the world is subject to brute 
mastery. While the ancient household head might of course exert a milder or harsher rule, he 
knows “neither law nor justice” (34). Or to put it another way, it is because women and slaves 
are called on to redeem the frailty of human, bodily, life—what Judith Butler would call 
 “precarious life”—that they are the objects, in fact they must be the objects, of violence. 
The key word is “mastery.” It is for Arendt, in the world and in the heart, a delusion. 
Thus when she goes on to make her famous distinction between violence and power that is at the 
center of On Violence, what matters is that a government will have recourse to violence in direct 
proportion to a decline in its authority and power, a decline that violence is desperate to redress 
(violence is always desperate). “Rule by sheer violence,” she writes, “comes about when power 
is being lost” (1970a, 53). State violence, we could say, is the last resort of the criminal (as we 
have seen so cruelly in the crackdown on the streets of Egypt, post–Tahrir Square, and 
throughout the world). When a state “starts to devour its own children,” Arendt observes, “power 
has disappeared completely” (think Syria) (55). “We know or should know,” she insists, “that 
every decrease in power is an open invitation to violence—if only because those who hold power 
and feel it slipping from their hands . . . have always found it difficult to resist the temptation to 
substitute violence for it” (87). And she observes: “Impotence breeds violence and 
psychologically this is quite true” (54). 
Arendt’s distinction between violence and power is important in relation to a feminism 
that wishes to align violence with male power of which it then becomes the inevitable expression 
(which makes female power, as MacKinnon once famously put it, “a contradiction in terms” 
[1988, 53]). Instead, Arendt allows us to see such an equation as the lie that violence perpetuates 
about itself, since it will do anything—destroy women and the world—rather than admit that its 
power is uncertain. Women then become the scapegoats for man’s unconscious knowledge of his 
own human, which means shared—that is, shared with women—frailty (“The Frailty of Human 
Affairs” is the title of one section of The Human Condition). Such frailty takes us to the darkest 
corridors of life and of the mind, to “the realm of birth and death” that must be excluded from the 
 public realm because “it harbors the things hidden from human eyes and impenetrable to human 
knowledge. Impenetrable because man does not know where he comes from when he is born and 
where he goes where he dies” (1958, 62–63). Or to put it another way, violence is man’s 
response to the fraudulence of his power and the limits of his knowledge. “Impotent bigness” 
indeed, as we might say. 
In her constant return to what cannot be mastered or fully known by the mind, Arendt, as 
I read her, is—perilously or brilliantly depending on your viewpoint—skirting the domain of 
psychoanalysis for which her stated antipathy is well known. But it is very hard not to read her 
account of things impenetrable to the human mind as having much in common with the Freudian 
concept of the unconscious that signals—over and above the sexual debris of its contents—the 
limits of man’s cognizance of the world and of himself. In Arendt’s account such limits strike the 
body politic as much as they do the human heart. This is her vocabulary for both these realms: 
“boundlessness,” “unpredictability,” and “the darkness of the human heart” (1958, 244, 191). We 
live, she states, in an “ocean of uncertainty,” against which there is no redress (1958, 244). It is 
the human condition. Men are fundamentally unreliable since they “can never guarantee who 
they will be tomorrow” (244). And how, she asks, can you see or foretell the consequences of an 
act “within a community of equals where everybody has the same capacity to act” (244)? To be 
part of the body politic means relinquishing your control over the future—yours and that of the 
other who is your equal, because they are your equal. Man’s “inability to rely upon himself or 
have complete faith in himself,” which, she insists, “is the same thing,” is “the price human 
beings pay for freedom” (244). While “the impossibility of remaining unique master of what 
they do”—read subordinating another to your power—“is the price they pay for plurality and 
reality” (244). If Arendt describes such open, equal, participation in the unpredictable reality of 
 the world as a “joy” (her word), she has also laid out with stunning clarity the unwelcome nature 
of her own insight and, hence, the lengths men will go to deny that insight and subordinate the 
world, in which I include women, to his purpose. 
In The Life of the Mind, which was Arendt’s last work, she takes this further. Now 
thinking appears even more clearly as the other side of false mastery and knowledge. This is 
why, for example, Arendt insists that the correct translation of Kant’s Verstand is not 
“understanding” but “intellect” or “cognition,” because it represents the “desire to know,” as 
distinct from Vernunft, which arises from the “urgent need to think” (1978, 1:57). “To expect 
truth to come from thinking,” she writes, “signifies that we mistake the need to think with the 
urge to know,” a need “that can never be assuaged” (1:61, 1:55). Both are anguished but one in 
the service of hammering the world into place, the other by its own interminable process, which 
has no end on which it can brand its name. Only intellect or cognition believes it can answer the 
unanswerable questions—that it can seize the world in its mental coil. Philosophers of this 
persuasion, she tells us, are “like children trying to catch smoke by closing their hands” (1:122). 
Against this false and futile knowing, Arendt places, even more strikingly in this last 
meditation, a thinking ego that moves among “invisible” essences, that is strictly speaking 
“nowhere,” “homeless in an emphatic sense,” which led, she suggests, to the early rise of 
“cosmopolitanism” amongst philosophers (1978, 1:199). Way ahead of her time, Arendt calls up 
her answer to the violence of the times in the terms—homeless, nowhere, cosmopolitan—that 
will be so central to the literary and cultural theory that will follow, although rarely 
acknowledge, her. And in doing so, she shows these terms seized from the history of the refugee 
and the exile—homeless, nowhere—the stateless, as we might say, whose predicament had been 
her own and which she did so much to articulate and dignify. True thought, then, is a form of 
 memory that exerts no dominion, ousts no one from their own space, because it remembers that it 
is or once was radically homeless. We could not be further from the despotic ruler of the 
Athenian household who dispenses violence to his women and slaves because it is in the remit of 
his own power, or rather because it is the only way he can struggle to exert control over the 
debasing, corporal, necessities of life. Nor from the modern-day state that turns to violence in 
order to shore up a power that has lost all legitimacy. Arendt’s life of the mind does not, then, 
point to some realm of abstract contemplation—her plea for thought is the child of its time. 
Perhaps then we should not be surprised, although I admit that I was, to find Arendt 
slowly inching her way to the world of the dream—the “royal road to the unconscious,” as Freud 
called it (till the end of his life, he saw The Interpretation of Dreams as his most important 
book). Whatever the achievements of the thinking ego, it will, Arendt writes, never be able to 
“convince itself that anything actually exists and that life, human life, is more than a dream” 
(1978, 1:198). To illustrate this suspicion—among the most characteristic of Asian philosophy—
she then selects the Taoist story of Chuang Tzu who dreamt he was a butterfly only to wake not 
to the unerring sureness of who he really was but to the realization that perhaps he was a 
butterfly dreaming he was Chuang Tzu (the same example used by Jacques Lacan to evoke the 
vanishing of the human subject in relation to the unconscious [Arendt 1978, 1:198; Lacan 2004, 
76]). But Arendt (being Arendt) does not of course leave it there. The dream returns—in the 
conclusion to The Life of the Mind—as the great equalizer in the shape of the king who dreams 
he is an artisan (since his quotient of life in that moment is no different from the poor artisan 
who dreams he is king) (Arendt 1978, 2:150). Moreover, she writes, since “‘one frequently 
dreams that he is dreaming’” (she is citing Pascal’s critique of Descartes), “nothing can 
guarantee that what we call our life is not wholly a dream from which we shall awaken in death” 
 (2:150). The personal resonance of such moments in this, her last, uncompleted, book, is surely 
striking. Arendt is exploring and relinquishing her own powers. 
Something is creeping back into Arendt’s writing. Remember the Greek citizen who 
mingled freely in the polis on condition of ruling with a rod of iron in his home. Remember too 
that, if women had to be subdued, it was because women were required to subdue in turn, and on 
his behalf, the messy, bodily frailties of life, the realm of birth and death that “harbors the things 
hidden from human eyes and impenetrable to human knowledge.” What seems, therefore, to be 
happening here is that this banished domain of the Greco-Roman dispensation is, in this final 
work, taking vengeance on the murderous technocratic know-how of the modern world, as 
slowly but surely it beats a path back into modernity as its only hope. I think we are talking about 
the return of the repressed. The options are stark. Violence or the dark, shadowy, innermost 
recesses of the hearth and heart where all knowing comes to grief. Violence or the world of the 
dream. 
Cue Melanie Klein. But before leaving Arendt for Klein, there is a crucial link to be made 
to Rosa Luxemburg, for whom Arendt’s enthusiasm knew no limits. There is the deepest and 
fully acknowledged debt. In all the works by Arendt I have been discussing so far, spontaneity—
Luxemburg’s central concept and another humble reminder of the unpredictable reality of the 
world—is a repeated refrain.7 But there is one moment when Arendt evokes Luxemburg that is 
of particular value for what I am trying to evoke here. She is talking about love. In its highest 
manifestation, Arendt writes, the willing ego pronounces, “Amo: Volo ut sis,” meaning “I love 
you; I want you to be.” Not, she goes on, “I want to have you,” or “I want to rule you” (1978, 
2:136). Love without tyranny. Compare this free-wheeling, uncontrolling version of love with 
Rosa Luxemburg. “Blessed are those without passion,” she wrote to her last lover, Hans 
 Diefenbach—a relationship conducted by correspondence from prison—“if that means they 
would never claw like a panther at the happiness and freedom of others.” Then she qualifies: 
“That has nothing to do with passion. . . . I possess enough of it to set a prairie on fire, and still 
hold sacred the freedom and the simple wishes of other people” (qtd. in Ettinger 1986, 213). 
True passion stakes no claim. Like democracy, it does not own, control, or master the other. It 
lets the other be. With Luxemburg, you barely have to scratch the surface. We are talking about 
sexual politics. 
In the middle of World War II, the pioneering psychoanalyst Melanie Klein finds herself with an 
unexpected opportunity—to analyze a ten-year-old boy over what they both know in advance 
will be the restricted time frame of four months. She takes notes after every session—several 
verbatim—and then collects them into one of the first full-length accounts of what her editor 
Elliott Jacques describes in his foreword to the published volume as a “total analysis” (5). The 
fact that this is only made possible by the conditions of the war—evacuation from London—a 
war which will color the analysis at every turn, is seen not as an obstacle but as the core of the 
process. Richard’s distress is multilayered and overdetermined. This in itself demonstrates the 
futility of trying to locate childhood anxiety either inside the mind or outside in the world (as if 
one precluded the other). He is an avid follower of the war—reads three newspapers a day, 
listens to all the news on the wireless, and threatens suicide at the fall of Crete if Britain should 
be defeated. But his fear of Hitler is overlaid—driven, perhaps, we do not have to decide—
certainly matched, by his fear of his father. The two are inseparable. And what he fears most 
from his father is what he is doing, or capable of doing, to his mother. 
“Just now he had spoken of the terrible things the Austrian Hitler did to the Austrians. By 
 this he meant that Hitler was in a way ill-treating his own people, including Mrs K., just as the 
bad Daddy would ill-treat Mummy” (Klein, 22). Or again: “Mrs K. interpreted R’s desire for 
peace and order in the family, his giving way to Daddy’s and Paul’s authority, as a means of 
restraining his jealousy and hatred. This meant there would be no Hitler-Daddy, and Mummy 
would not be turned into the ‘pig-sty’ Mummy, for she would not be injured and bombed by the 
bad father” (194). Hitler-Daddy. Klein’s interpretations are famously blunt, some would say 
coercive. But this very bluntness, I would like to suggest, has served to obscure something that is 
also staring us in the face. “Ill-treat,” “injure,” “bomb”; Mummy as a “pig-sty” for the garbage of 
the world and of the heart. Like Arendt, Klein is not best renowned as a feminist thinker. 
Nonetheless, when she looks into Richard’s fantasy world, what she sees there—what she urges 
him to see—is a scene of domestic violence. At one point Richard asks obsessively and 
solicitously about the number of Klein’s other, especially child, patients. Interpreting this as the 
rivalry and fear of displacement it clearly is, she then also suggests that perhaps he wishes Mrs. 
Klein to have child patients in the same way as he wanted Mummy to have babies: because, I 
quote, “they were less dangerous than men” (347, emphasis added). 
It is central to one radical feminist argument that the world of war and peace are no 
different. For MacKinnon, the 1990s assault on Bosnian women and their resistance to it 
challenges “the lines between genocide and war and, ultimately, between war and peace” (2006b, 
2). The significance of September 11, which she describes as an “exemplary day of male 
violence,” is that the number of people killed in the twin towers on that day was almost identical 
to the number of women murdered by men, mostly their male partners, in the United States over 
the average year (2006c, 260–61). MacKinnon is rightly challenging the indifference of national 
and international law toward violence against women compared with the military response to the 
 attacks of 9/11. Although when she asks, “Do these women not count as casualties in some war? 
Will the Marines not land for them?” (2006c, 272), I take my leave. To my mind the last thing 
feminists should be calling for is the U.S. Marines landing anywhere in the world any more than 
they do, mostly disastrously, already (although the advent of the drone today means that soldiers 
do not exactly land in the same way). 
But what is never discussed in this argument, which assumes a perfect fit or continuity 
between manhood and a violence of which it becomes the supreme and deadly fulfillment, is the 
terrain in which men, and before them boys, do psychic battle. Crucially, in Klein’s account, that 
terrain is not free of violence. It is drenched in it. She is the arch theorist of psychic violence, 
more specifically of matricide, as Julia Kristeva points out in her study of Klein.
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 In the case of 
Richard, the line between war and peace is indeed thin to the point of breaking. To differentiate 
them is his most urgent task. It is the work to be done. Richard’s challenge, we might say, is to 
resist the pull of the most deadly masculine identifications the world has on offer. Were that not 
an available option for him, indeed for men more generally, then feminism would surely be on a 
hiding to nothing, it would be on a losing battle—forever. If the child is father to the man, then, 
Melanie Klein’s life’s work suggests, what that means is always, urgently and painfully, up for 
grabs. There is always still everything to play for. 
If there is a profound link here for me to the ideas of Hannah Arendt, it comes through 
the category of thought. Richard is a boy who “knows his blows” (a slip of the tongue as fateful 
as it is wondrous) (Klein, 34). Goebbels and Ribbentrop become especially intense objects of 
hatred when they dare to say that Britain was the aggressor in the war. In this flagrant act of 
projection, they are way behind Richard himself, since the whole of his analysis is an inner 
negotiation with the violence that he feels himself capable of. He knows his blows. Remember 
 that lying was the target of some of Arendt’s fiercest political critiques (“Lying in Politics,” 
which gave rise to her idea of impotent bigness, was the title of her 1972 critique of the Vietnam 
War). Lying is, as we know, the collateral damage of warfare whose first casualty is truth. Klein 
is providing the psychic backdrop to Arendt’s protest against the corruption and deceptions of 
political life, which are if anything more flagrant today. In Richard’s narrative, lying is a form of 
self-harm, an act of blinding that then becomes the trigger for increasing violence against the 
other. When Klein suggests that Richard’s moral outrage at Ribbentrop’s lies might be due to the 
fact that he too is capable of aggression, I read her as saying that the one who deceives himself 
on such matters becomes his own—although by no means only his own—worst enemy. Lying 
drives aggression in deeper, leaving it no outlet finally other than the destruction of everything 
that litters its path (Hitler-Daddy assaulting pig-sty Mummy). When Klein offers this 
interpretation, Richard remains silent, “obviously thinking over the interpretation and then 
smiled.” When she asks him why he had smiled, “he answered that it was because he liked 
thinking” (25). This does not mean that he mentally submits to her or lacks his own psychic 
freedom: “How,” he insists at one moment, “can you really know what I think?” (111). 
For psychoanalysis, thinking is not of course exactly thinking as it is most commonly 
understood. Returning to Arendt’s insistence on the Kantian difference between the “urge to 
know” and the “need to think,” we could say that psychoanalysis pitches its tent firmly on the 
side of the latter. Unconscious thinking does not know its own ends. Epistemophilia, as the 
strongest impulse of the infant, was a term introduced by Klein into the psychoanalytic lexicon. 
We yearn to know (Sehnsucht, or “yearning,” was Rosa Luxemburg’s favorite word). Driven by 
sexual curiosity, the infant is pitched into a dark, shadowy world where she or he will struggle to 
find a place and that she or he cannot fully control, an “ocean of uncertainty,” as Arendt might 
 say. Such control would be as murderous as it is phony. It is the violent solution of the bad father 
who lashes out at the mother as a way of getting rid of what he cannot bear to countenance in 
himself. 
In this sense, Melanie Klein can be seen as the silent psychoanalytic partner of Hannah 
Arendt. Klein, we might say, is giving flesh and blood to the “passions of the hearth” outlawed 
from the polis by the Greek city-state. And for Klein, as for Arendt, what is at issue is once again 
what we might call “impotent bigness.” “Richard’s love was genuine,” she comments, “when his 
predominant attitude was to protect me against the bad father, or when he himself felt persecuted 
by the internal father and expected protection from me”—that is, when Richard refuses the 
invitation to identify with the violent father in his head (426). “He became artificial and 
insincere,” she continues, “when he felt he possessed the powerful penis with which he could ally 
himself in a hostile and dangerous way against me” (426). Only a boy who relinquishes the 
fantasy of the powerful penis will stop himself from attacking the mother. Ceding his 
omnipotence at the very moment he is most compelled by it is the only path to a viable 
masculinity—calling the bluff on impotent bigness, as we might say. Certainly it is the only way 
that this young boy, on the verge of puberty, can behave toward his woman analyst like a 
gentleman. Or to put it another way, violence against women is the boy’s deepest wish and worst 
fantasy. But if he knows this, can give it thought, then it becomes a fantasy he is less likely to act 
on. 
If Klein is key to this discussion, it is because she is sentient of just how high the stakes 
are, how treacherous the ground on which she moves. She is dealing with psychotic anxiety in 
which she believes all human subjects have their share. The greatest anxiety that afflicts the 
infant is that she or he has destroyed the object; a fear that she distinguishes crucially from the 
 anxiety that she or he might do so (which at least leaves open the possibility that you and the 
world might survive). On such finely graded psychic distinctions the health of her patients relies. 
Hitler-Daddy goes on killing because he has nothing left to lose. For Klein, to skirt this perilous 
domain in the analytic encounter is, therefore, a sop to a world in denial (the lies of Ribbentrop). 
The implications for her practice—what made her and still I think makes her so controversial—
resides in this. It was also at the heart of her famous dispute with Anna Freud.
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 In an extended 
footnote to the twenty-first session with Richard, she explains why she goes so far and why she 
believes it makes her patients better: 
It is in fact striking that very painful interpretations—and I am particularly thinking of the 
interpretations referring to death and to dead internalised objects, which is a psychotic anxiety—
could have the effect of reviving hope and making the patient feel more alive. My explanation for 
this would be that bringing a very deep anxiety nearer to consciousness, in itself produces relief. 
But I also believe that the very fact that the analysis gets into contact with deep-lying unconscious 
anxieties gives the patient a feeling of being understood and therefore revives hope. I have often 
met in adult patients the strong desire to have been analysed as a child. This was not only because 
of the obvious advantages of child analysis, but in retrospect the deep longing for having one’s 
unconscious understood had come to the fore. Very understanding and sympathetic parents—and 
that can also apply to other people—are in contact with the child’s unconscious, but there is still a 
difference between this and the understanding of the unconscious implied in psycho-analysis. 
(Klein, 100n) 
In such moments, Klein is making a plea—one I would wish to endorse—for a more 
psychoanalytically attuned world. 
So, in what, then, might the renewal of hope consist (which must be the only question)? 
At the end of a treatment whose long-term effects Klein is not in a position to predict, Richard 
begins to feel compassion for his enemies. We are on the last page: “He no longer felt impelled 
to turn away from destroyed objects but could experience compassion for them. . . . Richard, 
who so strongly hated the enemies threatening Britain’s existence became capable of feeling 
compassion for a destroyed enemy” (Klein, 466). This too is a political as much as a psychic 
point. Before we dismiss it as unrealistic or sentimental (or both), we might remember that had 
 the Allies felt sympathy for, and been less punitive towards, a defeated Germany after the First 
World War, we might not have witnessed the Second. 
In her important essay on brotherhood and the law of war, Juliet Mitchell suggests there 
is an irreconcilable contradiction in how women are viewed in war.
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 They are both the defeated 
and protected—in double jeopardy, as we might say. Rape as a war crime would then belong at 
the opposite psychic pole to what Richard arrives at here. No compassion. Probably no 
recognition of what you have done. Certainly no place for your own dead objects inside your 
head. Instead, the enemy you have defeated has to be destroyed and degraded over and over 
again. On this, for me, Klein’s bombed, damaged, pig-sty Mummy and Arendt’s thoughtlessness 
belong together. Klein was no social commentator, but she has described a world that repeatedly 
condemns itself to violence and where women pay the price for men’s self-blinding repudiation 
of the life of the mind. 
To return, finally, to literary writing, which is where this essay began. Not to Plath and Sexton 
but to two modern-day women writers who I think bring what women can do with words, 
disturbingly, into its next phase, into our time where violence against women seems to have been 
raised to a new pitch. First Temsula Ao, then the Irish writer Eimear McBride, who shot to fame 
in 2014 with her UK Orange prize-winning novel, A Girl Is a Half-formed Thing (after her novel 
had languished unpublished for nine years).  
Ao is Nagalese. She comes from that part of India that received the brunt of the newly 
independent’s nation drive to crush anything that might tar the image of national unity in which 
it so needed to believe and project to the outside world. In fact, the Naga rebellion predated 
independence, as the Naga National Council was formed in 1946. The violence in Nagaland is 
 not widely known. It is perhaps because Gandhi had stated that, after struggling for freedom, of 
course India would respect the desire for independence of any of its peoples, that the state then 
struck with such viciousness against the secessionist Nagalese.
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Ao entitles her collection of short stories, These Hills Called Home: Stories from a War 
Zone. She means it. She does not spare her reader. Neither of my two writers spare their 
readers—indeed not sparing the reader is the point, so this final turn to literature is not intended 
as a soft landing. As Ao states in her preface—“Lest we forget”—her aim is to probe how the 
atrocities of that era have “restructured or even ‘revolutionised’ the Naga psyche” (x).12 
Government forces would enter the villages with the intention to degrade, humiliate, and maim. 
In one story—“The Last Song”—a young girl, Apenyo, who starts singing almost from birth and 
becomes the lead soprano of her school, renowned across the land, carries on singing as a 
government soldier yanks her off to the local church where he and his fellow soldiers rape both 
her and her distraught mother and then kill them (Apenyo’s song then echoes through the village 
for years as “one more Naga village weeps for her ravaged and ruined children” [33]). 
The story I briefly focus on here is “An Old Man Remembers.” It is for me one of the 
most courageous stories of the collection: first, for so boldly entering the life of a man’s mind, 
and second, for what it finds there. Sashi is a man who has been part of the Nagalese resistance, 
although what he remembers is not a heroic struggle but a moment of violence which has 
haunted him ever since. The story is therefore a countermyth. It is also a talking cure. His aging 
body is racked with pain at least partly, the story suggests, because he cannot bring himself to 
tell the grandson who so lovingly tends him the truth about the war. “‘Grandfather, is it true,’ the 
little boy asks him, ‘that you and grandfather Imli killed many people when you were in the 
jungle?’” (92). He is completely thrown, has never spoken about his jungle days: “It was as 
 though that phase of his life was consigned to a dark place in his heart and would be buried with 
him when his time came. But now the question of a disturbed child stirred old spectres and left 
him speechless for a long time” (92). He has been hurled a question “from the other side of 
history” (93). When Sashi starts speaking, it is “like the massive gush of a waterfall which now 
threatened to drown both storyteller and listener” (97). 
What matters is not so much the main incident he remembers and that brutally conveys 
“how youngsters like Imli and him were transformed into what they became in the jungle” (96). 
More crucial is the fact that the morning after, the young Sashi and Imli decide anxiously and 
hesitantly to go back to see what they had done in the night (they, and the reader, have to look at 
the one they have destroyed). Facing your own violence therefore provides the core of the story 
as well as its narrative frame. As the grandfather tells this story, he starts to weep. The young 
boy is baffled—“after all, they were enemy soldiers, weren’t they?” (108). Why would you weep 
for your enemy? “Once in a lifetime,” the grandfather says to the boy, “one ought to face the 
truth” (108). To portray the Nagalese resistance as the agents rather than the victims of violence 
goes against the grain of how this community, with more than slight justification, views itself—
although for Temsula Ao, the future of her world depends on its doing so. “And the earth 
continued to be” are the last words of the story (113). 
Finally, Eimear McBride. Commentaries have rightly focused on the form of the writing, 
above all on the shortness of the sentences, and the absence of the comma—although that is not 
quite accurate. There are commas, but they are used very sparingly and to dramatic effect. But 
the overall effect is of a voice starting and stopping, choking almost on its own breath, as in these 
now famous opening lines: 
For you. You’ll soon. You’ll give her name. In the stitches of her skin she’ll wear your say. 
Mammy, me? Yes you. Bounce the bed, I’d say. I’d say that’s what you did. Then lay you down. 
 They cut your round. Wait and hour and day. (3) 
The fact that we are, as we soon discover, inside the womb simply adds to the suffocating effect. 
This is a voice—the only and unnamed voice in McBride’s novel—repeatedly halted in its tracks 
(a kind of breathlessness that places writing on the border between life and death). The break-up 
of language and the more-or-less dismemberment of the woman’s body are inseparable (the 
language manages to be as unrestrained and freewheeling as it is broken and clipped). It a story 
of sexual abuse—by the uncle, and then, as we are later told, of the mother by her own father: 
“Lie across each other’s beds we tell each other sorts of things. It makes us such close friends. 
No bits pieces left unsaid. And truth now tell the truth we say. Her father felt her up. It makes her 
red and cry. Daddy still loves her the best but he wouldn’t want anyone else to try. That is love” 
(95). Abuse passes down the generations. Think back through the grandfathers, as, perverting 
Woolf, one might say. 
At the opposite pole from trauma as unspeakable, which is one fashionable account of 
trauma, A Girl Is a Half-Formed Thing is traumatized speech with no exit. “Out my mouth like a 
mad thing raving clawing out my eyes” (162). As a reader you are given no cover. You have 
nowhere else to go other than the narrator’s head. Her brother is dying—she has known this 
since before she was born (inside the womb, where the novel begins). As a child, she is slapped, 
rammed, bruised, and bloodied by her mother, who she also describes as her “close friend” (95). 
Her uncle rapes her as a thirteen year old girl. She responds with a form of crazed promiscuity 
that allows men, including the uncle, repeatedly to tear her to shreds. This is modernism as slut 
walk, language as a type of syncopated abuse—the constant line breakage as the literary form for 
injury or self-harm (as Anne Enright put it in her review of the book, “You can almost hear the 
blows in the rhythm of the words” [2013]). To take just one example—it is also a rare sentence 
 with commas: “I met a man. I met a man. I let him throw me round the bed. And smoked, me, 
spliffs and choked my neck until I said I was dead” (96). The fact that this can also be read as a 
nursery rhyme simply intensifies the violence. 
To take one moment from very near the end of the novel, her beloved brother has just 
died. She walks out on the pious mourning party of the gathered relatives and heads for the 
woods where she knows—she seeks it out—she will meet with a violent sexual encounter, one of 
a trail that have run through the novel but which, in terms of what it does to her, and to the 
language of the text, makes everything that has preceded it seem—almost—harmless. This 
passage, which is not the worst of it, comes after the encounter itself when, you could almost 
say, she is collecting herself: 
I lie thisright place for me with my fingers ripped onthebody Mine is Lie in the ground 
faceWhere I right for meyes. Think about your face. Something. Shush now. Right now. 
FullofslimeThere better now. And I am. Done with this done. Fill the air up. Smear the blood up 
is there any no no t reeeeelly. My work is. I’ve done my I should do. I’ve done the this time really 
well. And best of. It was the best of. How. Ready now. I’m screaming in the blackness. Scream 
up until I’m done my body. Full of nothing. Full of dirt the. I am. My I can. There there breath 
that. Where is your face off somewhere. Where am I lay down this tool. I fall I felled. I banged 
my face head I think. Time for somewhere. Isgoing home. (194)
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None of the first reviews and critics of this novel dwelled on the sexual violence at its 
core.
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 The moment will lead—more or less—to her drowning, which is how the novel ends. But 
note two things about this passage. First, the “you”—as almost constantly throughout the text—
is her brother (from before her own birth till after his own death): “Think about your face.” The 
destruction of herself is therefore her loving return to him and a form of care: “There there.” 
This, incidentally, is why to describe this text as all interior monologue is not quite right. She is 
nearly always somehow speaking to him. Second, the narrator goes out looking for the violent 
encounter and knows where to find it. As well as everything else it monstrously is, it is also her 
achievement: “My work is. I’ve done my I should do. I’ve done this time really well. And best of 
 it. It was the best of.” Crucially, therefore, she is her own agent. Violence is sought. As well as 
being viciously what men do to her, it is a component of her grief. None of this mitigates 
anything; the protest against violence is not lessened but intensified. For me, the genius of 
McBride’s novel is that she can get all of this onto the same page or line or word, into the 
strangulated syntax of her prose. 
A Girl Is a Half-Formed Thing takes us back to where this essay started: to violence 
against women as the hallmark of the modern world. If McBride plunges us into the worst—and 
I have not conveyed the half of it—she also, like Sexton, like Plath, gives us a voice that 
brilliantly orchestrates its own sorrow and rage. The fight-back is in the words, in what a mind 
(the life of the mind, no less) can do with its own history. Along with the necessary fight for 
public and legal recognition of violence against women today, this continues to be, as I see it, 
one of women’s best weapons against cruelty and injustice. As feminists, we do not have—
should not be asked—to choose between the two, at least not in the world I want to live in. 
Jacqueline Rose, critic, novelist, and theorist, is professor of humanities at the 
Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, University of London. She writes widely about feminism, 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 See Middlebrook. 
2 For an account of these disputes, see Rose 2003. 
3 Subsequently printed as Spivak 2015. 
4 See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights; Campbell. 
5 See Martison. 
6 See Benhabib; Dietz. 
7 See Arendt 1970b; Rose 2014. 
8 See Kristeva; Jacobs. 
9 See Rose 1993. 
                                                                                                                                                              
10 See Mitchell. 
11 See Luithui and Haskar. 
12 My thanks to Akshi Singh for bringing Ao to my attention. 
13 In the lecture this passage was not read by me but projected on a screen for the audience to read inside their 
heads. 
14 For a fuller discussion of critical responses to the novel, including an account of the lecture in which I first 
discussed McBride—“Modernism: The Unfinished Legacy,” delivered at the British Association for Modernist 
Studies (BAMS) on June 26, 2014—see Collard. 
